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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent, :
-v-

:

JOSEPH M. LEWIS,

i

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 20048

Priority 2

:

This appeal is from a conviction of forgery, a second
degree felony, after a trial in the Second District Court.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S
78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1987).

Did the State present sufficient evidence to support
defendant's conviction?

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1978) provides:
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with
purpose to defraud anyone, or with knowledge
that he is facilitating a fraud to be
perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a) Alters any writing of another
without his authority to utters any
such altered writing; or
(b) Makes, completes, executes,
authenticates, issues, transfers,
publishes, or utters any writing so
that the writing or the making,
completion, execution, authentication,
issuance, transference, publication or
utterance purports to be the act of

another, whether the person is existent
or nonexistent, or purports to have been
executed at a time or place or in a
numbered sequence other than was in fact
the case, or to be a copy of an original
when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section "writing"
includes printing or any other method of
recording information, checks, tokens,
stamps, seals, credit cards, badges,
trademarks, money, and any other symbols of
value, right, privilege, or identification.
(3) Forgery is a felony of the second
degree if the writing is or purports to be:
(a) A security, revenue stamp, or
any other instrument or writing issued
by a government, or any agency thereof;
or
(b) A check with a face amount of
$100 or more, an issue of stocks, bonds,
or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim
against property, or a pecuniary interest
in or claim against any person or
enterprise.

Defendant, Joseph M. Lewis, was charged with forgery, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-501
(1978)•
Defendant was convicted of forgery in a jury trial held
January 12, 1987, in the Second Judicial District, in and for
Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, Judge,
presiding.

Defendant was sentenced by Judge Hyde on January 30,

1987, to a term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years at the Utah State Prison.

On Monday, December 8, 1986 at approximately 8:00 p.m.
defendant entered a business called "Cash-a-Check" in Ogden, Utah
and requested that a check be cashed (Tr. 8 ) . The check was made
out to defendant in the amount of $237.22 and was drawn on the
account of Stacey Enterprises; defendant indicated that it was a
payroll check (R. 2, 11)• Keith Baer, the manager of Cash-aCheck, informed defendant that the check could not be cashed
until the following morning when the bank could be contacted for
verification (Tr. 8 ) .
Defendant returned the next morning and completed an
information card verifying tnat he had not previously cashed a
check with the Cash-a-Check company (Tr. 9 ) . Mr. Baer became
suspicious when the check defendant presented did not appear to
be a payroll check (Tr. 11)• He again told defendant the check
would have to be verified with the bank and returned to his
office to verify the check (Tr. 10). Based upon his suspicions
he contacted Stacey Enterprises where the receptionist stated
that the company did not use those type of checks for payroll and
that they had been burglarized at 5:00 a.m. that morning (Tr.
13).

She requested additional time to research the problem (Tr.

13).

Upon later contact with Stacey Enterprises Mr. Baer learned

that checks had been stolen from the office and that the check in
question was not valid (Tr. 14). Mr. Baer then contacted the
police (Tr. 14) and Scott Dixon, the president of Stacey
Enterprises, and requested their presence at Cash-a-Check.
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Officer Stallings went to Cash-a-Check and requested
that defendant accompany him to the station (Tr. 40). At the
station, defendant told the officer that on December 7, 1987 an
unidentified man approached him on the 6treet and requested that
defendant perform some work for him (Tr. 40). Defendant claimed
that he worked for approximately 3 hours and received the check
in question for his labor (Tr. 41).
Scott Dixon also went to Cash-a-Check and stated to
Otficer Stallings that the defendant had done some work in
September through SOS temporary services for Stacey Enterprises,
however, was not employed by the business at the present time
(Tr. 20-22).

The social security number defendant gave SOS

temporary services differed from the number he entered on the
information card at Cash-a-Check (Tr. 45-46).

Mr. Dixon further

stated that the check in question, #1131, was among the checks
which had been stolen, and had not been signed by him (Tr. 30).
Finally, he stated that a copy of a check he had signed which was
on his desk the night prior to the burglary, had also been stolen
(Tr. 32-33).

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
support the verdict, this Court should review the evidence and
all inferences which may be drawn form it in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict.

The evidence presented by the

State and failure of defendant to provide an explanation of his
actions allowed the jury to infer that defendant committed the
crime of forgery.
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ABS5MB8I
RQIBT-I
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
Defendant asserts that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient for the jury to convict him.

Specifically, he

argues: 1) there was no evidence connecting him with the theft of
checks at Stacey Enterprises; and 2) his actions were
inconsistent with those of a person knowingly trying to pass a
forged check.
This Court has adopted the following standard of review
when considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:
The standard for determining sufficiency of
the evidence is that the evidence be "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that
reasonable minds could not reasonably believe
defendant had committed a crime." gtfrte y«
BQS&LQi 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). In
determining whether evidence is sufficient,
the Court will review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from
it in the light most favorable to the jury
verdict. State v. KereKfiS* 622 P.2d 1161,
1168 (Utah 1980). Unless there is a clear
showing of lack of evidence, the jury verdict
will be upheld. State v. Logan. 563 P.2d
811, 814 (Utah 1977).
State v.ffafrfrldpn,735 P.2d 410 (Utah App. 1987).
gtate yt BQpKfilf

709 p

As noted in

* 2 d 3* 2 (Utah 1985):

In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
•It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses . . . ." SJtatfi
X±-L&W, Utah, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (1980);
flCCfltd ££fli£_Xx_lind£D# Utah, 657 P.2d 1364,
1366 (1983). So long as there is some
evidence, including reasonable inferences,
from which findings of all the requisite
elements of the crime can reasonably be made,
our inquiry stops.
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Id. at 345 (citation omitted).

And, even if the Court views the

evidence as less than wholly conclusive, or if contradictory
evidence or conflicting inferences exist, the verdict should be
upheld.

£lal£_iA_fl£tf£lii 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).

In short,

•on conflicting evidence the Court is obliged to accept the
version of the facts which supports the verdict."

State„.,¥«.

IS&a£S£fl# 704 P.2d 555, 556 (Utah 1985) (cilina State v. HowgU*
649 P.2d at 93) .*
Defendant's insufficiency argument is little more than
a request for this Court to engage in a d£ novo review of the
weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, and
then to substitute its judgment for that of the jury.

As is

evident from the authority cited above, this Court and the Utah
Supreme Court have stated that they will not review a criminal
case in that fashion.
The present case is similar to State vt Williams. 712
P.2d 220 (Utah 1985).

There, defendant presented a check to a

muffler shop to pay for repairs.

The check was payable to

defendant and was drawn on the business account of the William
Angell Construction Company.

The Court stated:

Examining the evidence is support of this
verdict, Mr. Angell testified that the check,
along with two other checks, had been taken
from the office located in his home. He
further testified that he did not know
* The State is aware of the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision
in SMte.Y* Walkey, Utah, No. 20921, slip op. at 3 (August 25,
1987). There, the Court adopted a new standard of review in
sutticiency of evidence cases where defendant has had a bench
trial. Because the trial in the instant case was a jury trial,
Walker is inapplicable.

-6-

defendant, had never employed him, did not
owe him money, and that he had not written
the check nor authorized anyone to do so.
Defendant presented no evidence to controvert
the logical inferences which could be drawn
by the jury, i.e., that without any
explanation as to where he got the check or
from whom, the defendant knew the check was
forged. The evidence against defendant was
not so inherently improbable that it would
necessitate a reasonable doubt in the minds
of reasonable persons as to his guilt.
Id. at 223.
In the instant case, defendants argument that no
evidence was presented linking him with the theft of the checks
is immaterial.

Because defendant was charged with forgery, not

theft, the State was under no burden to prove that he took the
checks.

Even assuming defendant did not commit a theft,

sufficient evidence existed to convict him of forgery.
The jury made a logical inference from the following
evidence that defendant forged the check in question: 1) the
check had been stolen from Stacey Enterprises (Tr. 30); 2) Mr.
Dixon had not signed the stolen check, nor authorized anyone else
to do so (Tr. 30); 3) a copy of a check signed by Mr. Dixon has
also been stolen (Tr. 32), inferring tnat the check was taken to
assist in a forgery; 4) although defendant was not employed by
Stacey Enterprises (Tr. 20-21), he listed this as his place of
employment on the information card he completed at Cash-a-Check
(Tr. 18); 5) defendant listed an incorrect social security number
on the information card at Cash-a-Check (Tr. 45-46); 6) as in
Hilli.fiffi£# defendant presented no evidence to controvert the
logical inferences which could be drawn by the juryt that
defendant had forged the check.

Based upon the above facts
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presented at trial, sufficient evidence existed to convict
defendant of forgery.
Defendant's final claim that his actions were
inconsistent with those of a person knowingly trying to pass a
forged check is a question for the jury.
to review all

The jury had the duty

of the evidence and determine whether it supported

a conviction of forgery.

Sufficient facts existed to find that

defendant was attempting to pass a forged check and the jury was
under no obligation to find that defendant could not have
committed the crime of forgery because his actions were
illogical.

Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully
requests this Court to affirm defendants conviction.
DATED this

day of September, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

^J^KIMBERLY K. HORNAK
Assistant Attorney General
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